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Appendices: fascism in British India

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Fascism in British India (Appendices)

APPENDICES

Appendix I

   A short history of the “Hindustan Ghadar Party” (Indian Revolutionary Party), written in Italian by Iqbal Shedai [Archivio Storico Ministero Affari Esteri, Roma, Gab. Min. (1923-43) B. 1059 fasc. “Gadar Party”]. It is dated 19th May 1937.
   The Ghadar Party is not a recently formed party; it was founded in fact in the middle of 19th century after the British conquest of Delhi, the old capital of India.
   The leaders of the movement were the Maharani of Jhansi, prince Nana Farnavis and others under the patronage of the last emperor of the Mughul House. In 1856 the Party co-operated in the revolt against the British, but vainly because this revolution, known under the name of the Great Mutiny, was drowned in blood; hence the creation of the Indian Empire.
   The repression of the British was very strong, particularly against the Muslims irrespective of the fact they had taken part in the mutiny, though its leaders were Hindus.
   The Indian princes submitted to the British in the hope of preserving their realms; all the same was the attitude of the degenerated Hindu aristocracy, while the masses were kept quiet through the help of religious leaders who sold themselves to the colonial authorities.
   This period of the political sleep of India lasted until the beginning of 20th century, i.e. for about fifty years.
   In 1907 there was a reawakening with a revolutionary movement extended only to the Punjab and the Bengal: it shook the British Empire but it was repressed ruthlessly. Some of their leaders escaped abroad.
   In 1914, at the beginning of world war one, some of these leaders who had taken shelter in the USA decided to act and shifted the seat of the Ghadar Party to San Francisco.
   The leaders of the revived party were two great revolutionary men: the late Maulana Barakatullah (a great friend of Italy) and Har Dayal.
   At that time there were in America about 20,000 Indian workers and peasants, all of them joining the movement.
   The Party started its work by sending secret agents to India and to all the Countries where Indians lived: most of these agents were Sikhs and Muslims; however some Hindu intellectuals joined the movement, too.
   Some months after the break of the world war the German government started relations with the leaders of the Party through its diplomats in the USA, especially through its military attaché in Washington, [Franz] von Papen. However, these contacts were too late because all the ways to enter India were strictly controlled by the British, who were well aware of the danger coming from that side. In spite of this, a load of weapons was sent to India by sea with the assistance of some leaders of the Ghadar Party. This load was stopped near Singapore and some leaders were prosecuted and hanged by the British authorities.
   Another steamer, the Kama-gata-maru, with about 1,000 political refugees, reached India, but they were put under arrest and their leaders were prosecuted and jailed to life in the Andaman isles: some of them are still here, others escaped or were pardoned.
   The German government asked the Ghadar Party to send a delegation to Afghanistan in order to persuade Habibullah Khan, Amanullah’s father, to attack India in the north. The Ghadar Party sent its vice-president Barakatullah to Germany and Turkey: this mission reached Kabul in 1916 under the direction of the German officer [Werner Otto] von Hentig. However this mission had neither money nor weapons to offer Amir Habibullah, who was under the influence of the Intelligence Service, who had provided the Amir with gifts, money and some English girls to take care of him. Thus the mission was detained as a hostage in Kabul until 1918.
   The Germans were defeated in the whole of the East: India, Afghanistan, and Persia: India did not move in their favour. The Germans are to be blamed for their failure because they did not care to start propaganda in India in advance and to awake these countries suffering under British yoke.
   No need to speak further of these facts which should be a warning for the future. The leaders of the Ghadar Party in the USA, Canada and other allied countries were prosecuted ruthlessly: some were jailed, others deported to India, others escaped to neutral countries, but most of the members of the Party remained in California where they resumed their activities.
   In early 1922 the Soviet government contacted the Ghadar Party: two of their leaders went to Moscow but, because of intrigues by the Indian communist M. N. Roy, could not sign any pacts and left Moscow in the second week of February, leaving me there to go on with the proceedings. I too could not conclude anything with the Comintern and left a few months later. After this failure, the Party decided to try with Italy and ordered me to go to Rome, where I arrived on 10th June 1923 (Dr Enderle, who has known me since that date, is aware of my activity to obtain an Italian-Indian co-operation).
   In 1926 the British government sent Indian troops to Shanghai, Canton, etc. and the Chinese Government asked our Party to help them; also the USSR government asked our Party for specialists in revolutionary propaganda among Anglo-Indian troops, urging them not to fight against the Chinese. Our party sent to Nanking three prominent people at the disposal of that government: as our Party had already had a strong centre at Shanghai, our work was made easy by the fact that the Anglo-Indian troops in China had been recruited among the Sikhs and the Muslims of the Punjab, two areas where our party had worked previously. In two months our propaganda bore its fruits, as the Indian soldiers refused to fight against the Chinese. Some leaders of this military movement were prosecuted by the British authorities: some of them were shot, others were condemned to long term imprisonment, but the British government was compelled to send the Indian troops back to India. In this way China was saved by the three members of the Ghadar Party (two of them were with me in Paris). I offered also to send one of the two to Addis Ababa to incite the British garrison to rebel, but this proposal was refused!
   The British government realised the danger of the Ghadar Party and decided to suppress it: in 1930 they allocated 3,000,000 rupees to destroy it (1 rupee = 8 lire; 24 million lire!). From 1926 the relations between the Ghadar Party and the USSR government became very good; but in 1935, on the occasion of his visit to Moscow, Mr Eden informed Litvinoff that no co-operation between Britain and USSR was possible until the Comintern helped and encouraged the Ghadar Party.
   The Soviet government, who had realised the strength of our Party in the Chinese affair, was hesitant to break with us; however, their relations with the Ghadar Party became colder.
   For years, I myself had been informing my Party that we could not rely upon the government of the USSR because they were exploiting us for their own purposes.
   Thus I was ordered to strike up friendship with personalities of the Italian government following my activity to show that Italy and Britain would become strong enemies. I informed my superiors in reports which I have given to my Italian friends, too. I have always thought, I think and will think that only Italy could be a natural ally of India: because of its geographical position Russia is a too dangerous neighbour of our Country!
   For these considerations and according to the orders I have received from the Headquarters of my Party, I have put myself to the service of a co-operation between Italy and India. My Italian friends can testify it.
   During the war between Italy and Abyssinia the Ghadar Party printed and sent to India thousands of leaflets ordering the Indian troops to refuse to fight outside India and to be ready only to defend the Indian internal territory (see copies of these leaflets which have been handed over to Comm. Jacomoni previously).
   This fact was discussed in the Indian Parliament and some members (who sold themselves to the enemy) proposed to suppress the Ghadar Party by any means. For further details see the reports of the Indian Chamber published in India in 1935-36.
   A friend of ours succeeded in printing in Italy 2,000 copies of these leaflets which were sent to India under letter-forms from neutral countries.
   This is a summary of the activities of our Party outside India; inside India the Ghadar Party is unable to work under its name because it has been declared illegal. This is why in India our party has been given a new name: Kirty Kisan Party, the Workers’ and Peasants’ Party. This new name has been used from 1922, but after being declared illegal in 1934-35 the Party was renamed Hindu Socialist Party. We have been strongly prosecuted and hundreds of our members are still in jail: however, our work goes on.
   In the beginning our party, the Ghadar Socialist Party, was not represented in the Pan-Indian Congress, but when the British oppression became stronger we decided to join the Indian National Congress adopting the name of Congress Socialist Party and working under its President, Jawaharlal Nehru. However, Nehru’s advisers and his personal secretary belong to our party.
   From the above report it is clear that our Ghadar Party is the most important revolutionary party in India (data about it can be derived from the book of the British General MacMunn, Tempête sur l’Inde. Les activités secrèts et l’Intelligence Service aux Indes depuis la guerre mondiale, Paris, Payot, 1936, written by one of the heads of the Intelligence Service).
   In conclusion:
   The leaders of the Hindustan Ghadar Party think that if Italy is defeated by Britain it will be a disaster for the eastern peoples and in particular for India herself. For this reason the Ghadar Party wishes to have sincere and cordial relations with Italy.
   The Ghadar Party will never be the agent or the instrument of a foreign country: it has been such.
   It works only in the interest of India and of her friends, whoever they are.
   It is a nationalistic party: in case it comes to power, it will organize India on the corporative principles, as they have been enunciated by the Duce.

Appendix II

   A draft for India. Translated from “Schema di lavoro per l’India” [Archivio Storico Ministero Affari Esteri, Roma, Gab. Min. (1923-43) B.6 fasc.406]. No date, but April 1941.
   England is converting India into a large base of operations against the Axis in the Mediterranean, in Africa, and in the East. India is becoming the principal supplier of war material for these sectors. The British under-secretary for India, Mr Amery, declared these days that, in order to face the military power of the Axis, India is to supply from ten to twenty million soldiers. The British government intends to obtain them from the Indian provincial governments through a compulsory conscription.
   It is therefore necessary and urgent to prepare a plan of military-political action to make India as ineffectual as possible for the British purposes and to contribute to the fall of the British power in India. This would provoke the complete victory of the Axis and the end of the war. It is advisable to make preparations in Italy in order to profit in the future: if this work is made by the other member of the Axis, the profits will go to it. This work is urgent: otherwise it is the other member who will get the future profits.
   In the political field we must oppose the British domination in India: therefore we must intensify the propaganda, reinforce the Indian revolutionary parties, help their unification and the partisans of of non-violence who are presently helping the British.
   In the military-revolutionary field, waiting for direct military operations against India, we must favour their opposition to conscription of Indian troops, intensify and widen the struggle of the frontier tribes against the Britih, create violent guerrilla and terroristic actions in India in order to block the British administration, sabotage the war production, help the political and revolutionary parties.
   In short, the main points are the following:
   In the political field
   1. Propaganda. It can be carried out almost exclusively through radio, as already started. It is necessary to deal with other forms: workers’ disturbances, terroristic and guerrilla actions in India to block the war production and prevent the supplies from India to the forces fighting against the Axis. We must give radio-instructions for the organization of strikes and terrorist attacks against war industries, railways, means of communications, British officers; and for the manufacture of guerrilla weapons and explosive material, etc.
   2. It is necessary to create in Italy an Indian nationalist-revolutionary committee made up of the best Indian representatives, to be radio announced to India. 
   3. Later on, we must set up an Indian nationalist-revolutionary government. However, it is not the right time for this because the possibility of proclaiming the independence of India is not near: such a government would be considered a puppet in the hands of the Axis and would provoke the reaction of the Indian national parties, who would support Britain against a government created here. An Indian recognized government in Italy will be useful when the military operations reach the East. However, it is convenient for the Axis, or for Italy, to make some press or official declarations in favour of the national aspirations of India.   
   In the political-revolutionary field.
   1. The anti-British guerrilla of the tribes of the Indo-Afghan frontier is to be extended to all the tribes in addition to the tribes of Waziristan. In such a case the number of the fighters would be larger: the frontier tribes rely on 250,000 fighters, who would engage 100,000 anglo-indian soldiers. Besides, the extension of the war-front along the frontier will encourage the political movement and the development of the internal revolutionary movement in India. To react this goal it is necessary to give the Faqir of Ipi more financial resources to extend his action to all the tribes concerned.  
   It is necessary also to send technical equipments, such as radio sets to connect the various tribes and the Faqir of Ipi with this place [Italy], along with code-books, binoculars, materials to make explosives and bombs, machine-guns, anti-aircraft weapons, etc; materials to be sent partly now and partly after we have occupied a territory (Syria and Iraq) situated at such a distance from the Indo-Afghan frontier as to deliver them by planes. 
   In the meantime it is advisable to send the Faqir of Ipi some military technicians to look after the making, the use and the servicing of the arms and the equipments, besides instructing the natives.         
   2. To employ Indian prisoners. All the Indian prisoners in Northern Africa and somewhere else are to be sent to Italy. The best elements among them will be chosen  and instructed politically (by the Indian revolutionaries present here) and technically and militarily to be sent by submarines or planes to India and to the tribe frontiers in the capacity of political agents, directors, technical instructors of revolutionary actions. For this purpose we can set up a sort of school for the political and military-revolutionary preparation of the Indian prisoners. These agents will be sent to India along with the weapons (see next point 4). 
   When the number of these prisoners-of-war is sufficient, an army and air force will be formed so as to be employed on the fronts where the English employ Indian troops.
   3. Propaganda among the Indian troops sent against the Axis forces. We must provoke their rebellion and desertion. Propaganda it to be carried on through leaflets and pamphlets, in the language and words according to religion and place of origin: this material will be compiled by the Indians present in Italy and will be printed and distributed by the War Ministry (mainly by planes).  
   It will be necessary to promise a fair treatment to the Indians who take side with us (advancements and special recompenses to non-commissioned officers and to officers who desert along with their troops) and to keep them informed of the military and political situation. I think that the Indian troops in North Africa are not aware of the recent events in North Africa and in the Balkans.  
   4. Weapons to be sent to India. This is the most important problem from the revolutionary point of view. The doctrine of non-violence has been accepted in India mainly because the population does not have weapons to use. If enough weapons are sent to India, as the Irish of America did for Ireland, it would be possible to develop a revolutionary movement and a guerrilla so as to make England loose the control of India and cannot use India as a military base for the defence of her Empire in Africa and in the East.
   These weapons can be sent as soon as we have the control of the coasts of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean (secret shipment by submarines or corsar ships) and when we occupy countries from where to send the arms to India by planes. A sufficient number of Indian agents must be ready to accompany the sea and air consignments (revolutionary paratroopers to special Indian areas).
   The weapons must be suitable for guerrilla and terrorist actions, that is light machine-guns, pistols and machine-pistols, silencers for pistols and guns, time bombs, explosives, small radio-sets, etc. It is advisable to use weapons compatible with munitions available locally. This material is to be collected as soon as possible and to be sent there.
   It is also advisable to create links between our organization in Italy and the Indian revolutionaries through clandestine radio-sets to send them our directions and to receive military and political information about India.
   Funds for India and neighbouring Countries.
   We can buy gold sterlings in Syria either through the “Banco di Roma” which has large quantities of money in local currency or buy directly sterling and French francs. We can dispose of Indian banknotes (rupees), printing them here; they are necessary for the work of frontier tribes and in India.
   Expenses are to be borne by the military bodies. The whole work under discussion is to be carried on by the military bodies, except the radio propaganda.
   General Staff Colonel Giovanni Tavazzani, who knows problems and persons in India and is in contact with people of the Indian nationalistic and revolutionary movement, should be employed as military adviser for India and the Middle East and liaison-officer for the military bodies to co-operate with our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and should carry on with the work as per this draft.

Appendix III

   A note from the Vice-Director General for the Transoceanic affairs, Adolfo Alessandrini, to the Foreign Minister, Ciano. Translated from “Appunto. Il Vice Direttore Generale degli Affari Transoceanici, Alessandrini, al Ministro degli Esteri, Ciano” [Archivio Storico Ministero Affari Esteri, Roma, I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, IX Serie, 1939-43, vol.VIII, Roma, 1988, pp.86-92]. It is dated 31st December 1941. 
   Secret.
   Following an invitation of the German Government, there have been taken in Berlin conversations on questions concerning India and the Countries of Middle East. They have been organized by the Consul General Wüster, Director General of the “Information Abteilung” of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the direction of the State Secretary Keppler. The attendants were many officers of the “Auswärtiges Amt”, two representatives of the German Supreme Command, Mr Subhas Chandra Bose, Mr Ghulam Siddiq Khan, and Mr Iqbal Shedai. Besides our representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there was a high officer of the SIM.
   Before the conversations there took place a meeting reserved only to Italian and German representatives concerning clarifications on our points of view. An almost complete agreement was reached on all the problems. This was due to the preliminary organization by the Cabinet and the Direction General of Transoceanic Affairs and by the German Embassy in Rome. The Berlin conversations were the result of our work and our co-operation on the matter.
   In the conversations on Indian questions here are the problems under examination:
   1. Creation of offices. The creation in Italy of a special office under the supervision of the DGAT [Direction General Transoceanic Affairs], comprising representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the SIM [Information Military Service], of the Ministry of Popular Culture, and a group of Indian agents under the order of Mr Iqbal Shedai. The task of this office is to examine all the problems concerning India and the Countries of the Middle East.
   On the German side, the creation of an “India Office” made up of only Indian agents under the order of Mr Bose. In the future this Office might be transformed and recognized as a mission of “Free India” in Germany. Mr Bose insisted on this personal rcognition but the German counterpart decided to delay any decision on the occasion of the declaration of India’s independence. I have not made any declaration on the matter. Our “India Office” is only Italian: Mr Shedai is considered a technical member. When Berlin recognizes Mr Bose as a “Representative” of India, we will give the same recognizition to Mr Shedai, who has been for years a faithful and loyal friend, whose work has been very precious. Mr Shedai is a Muslim and we are interested in having in Rome a Muslim representative of the future India.
   2. Propaganda. I reported the propaganda work which we started a year ago. I    underlined that the best results were obtained in the field of radio broadcasting service, official and pirate: in particular the pirate programs of Mr Shedai, supported with information from our Minister in Kabul [Pietro Quaroni], have provoked great reactions in India. Though they have some doubts, the British authorities have been unable to locate this radio; they think that it is located in the Waziristan.             
   During the conversations the German and Indian representatives have praised our broadcasts. The German representatives have decided to follow our example: they will send to Rome some technicians to get information about our services.
   I have also informed them of the contacts which had enabled our Minister in Kabul to carry on with another type of propaganda through the diffusion of pamphlets and leaflets sent there from Italy.
   Herr Wüster informed us that, in addition to broadcasts and general propaganda papers, their “India Office” will publish a sheet of Indian news which is going to become a newspaper in hindustani and in English. It will be distributed in the largest possible way, in so far as the present difficulties of communications allow it.
   3. Indian Legion. The representative of the O.K.W. [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht] declared they are studying the creation of an Indian Legion made up of prisoners who will be selected and re-educated. This re-education will be done in Germany by  English-speaking German officers supported by Indian officers selected among the prisoners. These troops will not be destined as a military support but will be a means of propaganda. The will be equipped with special weapons not usually upplied to the general infantry; however, for the time being it will not be possible to organize more than a battalion: more units will be organized when the number of prisoners increases. This Legion will be destined to the future front on the Caucasus.      
   I expressed our desire to organize a legion to be employed on the Libyan front, but Mr Bose opposed saying that the Indian soldiers will fight more willingly if they are moving towards their Country. With the German support I insisted and it has been decided to send to Northern Africa some elements instead of a detachment.
   A representative of the German Information Service described a program of sabotage activity, dropping of paratroopers, sending of agents, etc.
   I informed them of our contacts with the Faqir of Ipi, underlying the good impression we had of him, his programs and his activity. I recommended to send him some tangible demonstration of our appreciation and some aids. The Faqir said he is able to create a special air-field for the Axis aircrafts.
   Both the Germans and the Indians admitted that the territory under the Faqir’s control can be a very good “Stutzpunkt” [backing-point] for future military operations and dropping of propaganda material.
   4. Declaration of Indian Independence. The problem of the declaration of Indian independence was the most important point of the conversations. The main and convincing speaker was Mr Bose. He said that the best support of the Axis to the Indian cause is an official, public and solemn declaration of the Axis governments stating to make India a free and independent State in the near future. He added that the British propaganda plays a very good game and is successful with the Indian masses by saying that Germany and Italy are advancing to India not to free her but to subjugate her and in more ruthless way. This opinion is making its way deeply. his doubt exists also in the minds of the Indian patriots living abroad, who try to work for the victory of the Axis. Only a contrary and solemn declaration of the Axis is able to clear these doubts and prevent any possibility for our Armed Forces to be faced with a united India at the orders of London, well-determined to fight till the end.
   Also Mr Shedai expressed the same point of view and reminded us that it is a danger if Britain can dispose of the Indian riches and of the large number of the Indian population.  
   The Secretary Herr Keppler answered saying he realized the importance and the validity of the opinions expressed by the Indian friends, but the decisions of the upper spheres was to postpone the declaration of the Indian independence to a more favourable time. Many reasons of general and particular character advise it. The Axis Powers – added Dr Keppler – do not wish to follow the British example of announcing previous and groundless declarations in favour of any Countries and peoples. These promises will be made only when the Axis Powers are sure of being able to maintain their promises and to give a practical aid. 
   The example of the untimely revolt in Iraq, which might have been more important, teaches not to speed up situations which are not actually mature. Dr Keppler added that the decision of postponing the declaration of the Indian independence was taken by the Duce and the Führer during their latest meeting.
   On my part I expressed the same point of view of Dr Keppler.
   Mr Bose and Mr Shedai objected by saying that a new very important fact has modified the situation in these days, the sudden entrance of Japan into war, their important successful military operations and their armies reaching the Indian borders.
   In the words of Mr Bose and Mr Shedai there was a particular and strong worry about Japan’s intentions to India. There is no doubt that, if the Indians are worried about the real intentions of the Axis to them, they are more worried about the intentions of Japan to India. As a proof of our sincerity, the Indian representatives asked for a declaration of the Axis in favour of India, valid also from Japan’s side.
   Dr Keppler recognized the Indian worries, even though he did not mention the dangers coming from Japan. However he admitted that the present situation is completely different from the one existing at the time when the Duce and the Führer decided to postpone the declaration, and promised to submit the question to the Führer. I associated with him and promised to submit the same question to our Minister of Foreign Affairs [Ciano].
   At the end of the discussion concerning the declaration of the independence I suggested that in the meantime, waiting for a re-examination of the whole problem and for instructions from the upper spheres, in order to overcome the present silence of the Axis powers, we might give instructions to the press and the radio of our two Countries to show a sincere interest to the Indian independence; in fact, an increasing propaganda in favour of India might counterbalance the British propaganda. The German and Indian representatives approved of this proposal to be sumitted the Minister von Ribbentrop. I had the impression that Minister von Ribbentrop approved of it and gave instructions to the German press; in fact, German and Italian newspapers started publishing news about India and articles in favour of the cause of Indian independence.
   The meeting closed with the decision to inform the Embassies of Japan in Berlin and in Rome of our work, asking them to let us have their considerations and to submit to their Government the problem of the declaration of independence.
   According to this decision, back from Berlin, without entering into details, I informed the Counsellor of the Embassy of Japan, Mr Ando, who was interested in the work we have done and promised to inform Tokyo by telegraph. No answer has yet arrived from the Japanese governmnt, but the Japanese telegraph agencies have published news of Indian meetings in Tokyo and Shanghai sponsored by the Japanese authorities and of Indian and Burmese committees who made appeals for the independence of their Countries.
   These Japanese initiatives worried the German government who has now realized the necessity to go on for an official declaration of the Axis in favour of India and the Countries of the Middle East without any further delay. On 30th instant [January 1942] Minister von Ribbentrop presided over a meeting to examine the problem.
   5. Situation in Afghanistan. A special session was called to examine the situation in Afghanistan. Mr Ghulam Siddiq Khan, former Foreign Minister of king Amanullah, an intelligent and able person, appreciated by the Germans, declared that the Afghan nation is ready to rebel to the British and to start a guerrilla warfare in the Country and at the Indian borders, in spite of the anglophile attitude of the Prime Minister and the Government, who have been influenced by the rupees distributed by the Delhi Government. However, he added that the British have allowed the Afghan government to keep the two Axis Legations in Kabul in order to give the impression that the Country is independent, while it is not so. It is a work of appeasement which the Delhi Government is doing through bribes and intrigues. Mr Ghulam Siddiq Khan thinks that, if the Axis Countries closed their Legations saying openly that Afghanistan had lost her indipendence and that the King and the Government are London’s instruments, and that a real independence will be given by the Axis, the Afghans will fight against the hated British.
   This proposal is, no doubt, interesting and intelligent; but will the Country rise up – as Mr Ghulam Siddiq Khan – and in what extension and measure?
   It is doubtful that the Afghan people will rise up only because of the closure of the two Axis Legations. Perhaps a real revolt will take place only in case of an Anglo-Russian invasion of the Country; but, in the eventuality of this occasion, the present Government, though bribed by Englih money, might opposed and move to the mountains, guiding a guerrilla.
   Mr Ghulam Siddiq Khan excludes the above mentioned possibility; even if he is right, the proposed closure of the two Missions seems unsufficient to create a violent popular reaction. On the other side, the two Legations are nowadays extremely useful because they give us information and distribute propaganda material, without which we would know nothing of the Indian situation. Finally, we think that Mr Ghulam Siddiq Khan is urged by the personal desire to obtain the Axis’ public recognition King Amanullah and he himself had been waiting for years.
   In conclusion, we think that the problem should be examined with the utmost care and that we should wait for the development of further events, particularly of military nature. If the Axis forces reach the Caucasus next Spring and if the Afghan people show clear signs of revolt, we might accept Mr Ghulam Siddiq Khan’s suggestions. I said all this during the meeting and the German representatives agreed with me.
   We have however decided to look after the situation in Afghanistan with the greatest attention and to intervene at the right time.
   The Afghan problem cannot be separated from the Indian problem: they are strictly linked together. If the entry of Japan into war and the advance of the Japanese troops produce a new stand of the Axis about the Indian problem, a declaration in favour of Afghanistan will not be delayed. King Amanullah, whom we have been helped for years and who is a good card in our hands, might be recognized by us as King of Afghanistan and Head of the Muslim State of the Middle East the Afghans have been dreaming for years, a State we must link to our colonial-muslim system.
   6. Some considerations about Mr Bose. Mr Bose, who left India and reached Europe only through our help, had perhaps felt that Rome hd not given him sufficient consideration. Actually, we have been very open and kind to him, but we had thought and still think that his support to the cause of India is only personal. Mr Shedai informed me of many facts I fully agree upon.
   This does not mean that Mr Bose is not to be considered important and that our co-operation with him is not to be continued. However, our reference is to Mr Shedai, particularly because he is Muslim.
   The Germans have for Mr Bose the same consideration we have for him, though they have given him money, houses and cars. He is surely an intelligent man; with his Forward Bloc within the Indian Congress he succeeded in abandoning Gandhi’s negative policy, detrimental and harmful to us. Maybe, in the future, he will be able to follow our pattern in India. However, waiting for those times, I am sure that men more practical and resolute, such as Mr Shedai, are of immediate help.
   It is my duty to point out the great interest of the Germans for the subject dealt with in the meeting. They underlined the fact that the agenda and the discussions had been made in Rome, and had shown a great interest in the problems of the Middle East, asking for a closer co-operation.
   Therefore a full examination of the problems, the decisions we reached at, and the Berlin discussions have been very useful.

Appendix IV

   What is Pakistan?, written in Italian by Iqbal Shedai [Archivio Storico Ministero Affari Esteri, Roma, Gab. Min. (1923-43), busta 725 (Gab. 408)]. No date, but 1942.
   The word “Pakistan” has been heard in Europe in the recent two-three years, but people ask what it is. Is it something new from India or is it one of the usual English creations? Somebody might ask information about the name and the why of this new political idea. Let us start with the name, which is new though its content is very old.
   From a political point of view Pakistan means the creation of an autonomous state as a federal unity in the Federation of India, but with a very great autonomy on the affairs concerning the population of a given region. Which is this region? It is explained by the word “Pakistan”. Pakistan means: Punjab (P), Kashmir (K), Sind (S), Beluchistan (TAN), that is an autonomous government comprising a large territory with a population of about 45 million inhabitants, 70% of them Muslims. Why do then the Muslims ask for a particular autonomy?
   The answer needs a general panorama of the historical and political conditions in India, and in particular of the various movements to reach the freedom of the Country.
   The present population of India is about 300 million people out of which 90 million are Muslims: the majority is Hindus, about 280 million people, the rest being Jains, Sikhs, Christians, Parsees, etc. There appears that the two larger groups are the Hindus and the Muslims.
   The Mughal Empire in India lasted three centuries; though the ruler was Muslim, the empire was practically a secular state. It was never a secular state and was not governed by the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet (hadith): see the Akbar-namah by Abul Fazl, and Ibn Hasan, The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire (Oxford, 1936). In 16th century Akbar tried to unite the two largest groups of the population by giving the Hindus the highest responsibilities in the government. Hindus were the governors and the army commanders in the most difficult areas of the empire, though as in Afghanistan the population was Muslim and under Mongol domination. After Akbar’s death this experiment failed for two reasons: first, the military incapacity of the Hindus; second, the old Brahman caste influenced the Hindu society, particularly in the south (this idea of a society divided into castes opposed the equality principles of Islam creating a struggle between the two systems).
   At the beginning of 18th century the Mughal empire entered a period of decadence: this is the reason of the extension of the British influence in many parts of India, principally in the south and the east. In 1757, in the battle of Plassey, the British conquered a large part of the Bengal, but the rebellion in Mysore, led by a Muslim prince, Hyder ‘Ali, prevented a further British expansion. Hyder ‘Ali intended to stop the decadence of the Mughal empire because he thought that a strong Mughal empire was a guarantee of freedom for the whole of India. Besides, the Mughal state, situated in the north and with the military support of the Muslim population, was able to face any warlike enterprise. Finally, no military support would come from the Hindus, who were very able in production and commerce but unable in the military field because of the cast system, which has always prevented a unitary effort against the enemies.
   Hyder ‘Ali fought two battles against the British. He wounded but not killed the English snake; being unable to throw the British out of India, Hyder ‘Ali allied with the Hindu princes, but - as always - the British gold and the policy of the “divide et impera” prevented him to fulfil his intention. His son and successor, Tipu Sultan, continued his task by making an alliance with France.
   Before the opening of the Suez Canal, the traffic between Europe and India was conveyed through the Mediterranean; Tipu understood that “la tranquillité de l’Inde dépend souvent d’un coup de canon tiré dans la Méditerranée ou dans l’Océan” (Histoire des Progrès et de la Chute de l’Empire de Mysore, Paris, 1801, tome I, p.122). As he realized he could not get any support from India, Tipu looked at foreign countries, in particular at France who had some establishments along the southern coast of India. Hence, he sent a three-member delegation to the court of Louis XVI in Paris: it was received publicly by the King of France on 3rd August 1788, but when they “ils demandaient des secours contre les anglais, le Government français ne put leur donner que des spectacles et des fêtes” (p.139). It is clear why Louis XVI could not give any support: France was going towards a revolution and it was not possible to be engaged in far away places. However, when Napoleon was in power and went to Egypt in 1798, he wrote a letter to Tipu Sultan promising help, but it was too late. Besides, Napoleon could not fulfil his promise because he was defeated by the British fleet at Abukir.
   Tipu died fighting: his fall was the last flame, but it is a significant episode of the Indian history. This makes us think that the only community able to work for the freedom of India is the Muslim one. History has confirmed it in other cases.
   Let us make a brief digression about the character of the Muslims.
   The Muslim mentality is practical and attached to facts. For centuries the Muslims got experience in the arts of government and political alliances, and of problems of peace and war. On the other side, the Hindu mentality is idealistic: the world has no realty, it is only apparent and the only realty is the immanent Supreme Being which manifests himself in all the visible things of the material world. The Hindu lacks a good moral system: there is no clear line between the moral and the immoral. The absence of political and social necessities for the society derives from the lack of a clear moral concept. No doubt, they accept a government, but as something to bear, not as a positive fact. The only aim of the Hindus’ life is the liberation of soul from the chains of the body, that is to say that the final aim is the dissolution of the union between soul and body as soon as possible. No need to go into details with the Brahman and Buddhist doctrines and conclude that the Hindus lack a clear political and social ideal.
   Let us go back to history. After Tipu’s death, the centre of activity moved to the north, where the population had always been majority Muslim and the Indo-Islamic culture had left deep marks in usages, customs e beliefs of those populations.                     
   At the end of 18th century, when the East India Company extended to the Bengal, the Muslims were very deeply influenced by Hindu customs and ideas. Thus the Muslims thought that the very first step was to give up all non-Islamic elements so as to create a completely new religious and spiritual movement.
   This movement was known as “Wahhabi” after the name of ‘Abd ul-Wahhab, the great reformer of the 18th century; the leader of this movement was Syed Ahmed from Rai Bareilly in north India [Oudh]. In that period the Punjab was under the Sikh power, which was appreciated by the population because it was potentially able to throw the British out of India: the Punjab, governed by Ranjit Singh, was majority Muslim.
   The Muslims tolerated his government. However, during the last years of his reign, due to some whims, he started some actions against his Muslim subjects. This inflamed the feelings of the Wahhabis, but pleased the British: the Wahhabi leader was killed in battle in 1831. The Sikh power declined and in the span of twenty years the British were able to conquer the whole of the Punjab.
   The idea of Syed Ahmed was to create a small Muslim state in north Punjab, where the Muslims could live and practice their religion freely.
   In the meantime the British were victorious and plundered the country: this led to a new campaign against them. This time it was started by the prime minister of the Peshwa dynasty, Faizullah Khan, from Cawnpore. The British had cut off the pension to the last Maratha ruler, Baji Rao II [1796-1818], refusing to recognize the adopted son [Nana Sahib], a custom officially accepted by the British. In 1849 Faizullah Khan went to England to support his case before the Queen unsuccessfully: he travelled through France (probably through Italy, too) and went also to Russia to look for help (John W. Kaye & H. Malleson, The Indian Mutiny, London, W.H.Allen, 1888-89, 6 vols).
   Back to India he [Faizullah Khan] organized a secret movement which contributed to the famous Mutiny in 1857: the aim was the same, i.e. to create in the north a small [Muslim] state to oppose the British conquest, but the task was too big. He might have succeeded if it had not been for the betrayal of the Sikh and Hindu princes who were under the influence of the British policy of “divide et impera”.
   In the period following the Mutiny the Muslims were subjected to persecutions: important families were dismembered and the Muslim culture suffered a lot. However, the Muslim community decided to study the western culture so as to be able to have their part in modern life.
   Another event modified the British attitude towards the Muslims. Russia moved to the borders of her empire: in 1866 they held Bukhara, Khiva, Samarqand. In 1864 the Prime Minister, Prince Gourichkof, published a memorandum, justifying the Russian advance in the interest of civilization. This paper alarmed the British government: after 1870 the British policy towards India changed, particularly towards the Muslims.
   The foundation of a Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at ‘Aligarh in 1875, the creation of Municipalities [1882] to give more powers to the Indians, the setting-up of an Indian National Congress in 1885, were the result of the Russian danger and of the British policy of appeasement. The Muslims accepted them, but they did not forget their ideal [of freedom] and thei past sufferings. They were only waiting for the right moment: it is not possible to understand the history of India in the second half of 19th century without considering the Russian expansion in Central Asia (H.G. Rawlinson, Central Asia, London, no date). The last quarter of 19th century and the first decade of 20th century are a period of Muslim recovery and of an attempt to be inserted in some world political currents.
   Which were the main events? 
   About 1919 Britain tried to settle a base in Hijaz under the pretext to create a hospital for Indian pilgrims. The Muslims realized the danger and protested violently: hence the project was abandoned.                
   During the First World War many Indian leaders were jailed; as soon as war ended, the Muslims joined the non-Co-operation movement in 1920-21 showing their weight in the world policy.
   Some problems regarding the Indian Muslims compelled the State Secretary for India, Samuel Montague, to resign in March 1922, and the Prime Minister Lloyd George six months later. From 1911 to 1930 the Muslims tried to compromise with the Hindus in order to speed up the freedom of the country; but, except the short period 1920-21 when the non-Co-operation movement was in Muslim hands and Gandhi appreciated it, the understanding disappeared because of petty “religious” problems, such as the cutting of sacred trees or the killing of cows which were important in the Hindus’ eyes. From 1923 to 1932 an annual Conference for unity has taken place, but under some pretexts they failed because of the orthodox Hindus.
   Because of this “political” experience the Muslims were compelled to think of themselves and of a limited area of their own where to live free and develop according to modern discoveries, following in particular the pattern of Italy and Germany.   
   The necessity of a small independent territory is obvious: the aspiration to “Pakistan” which is a new name for an old idea.
   Will it be successful? This is the question. And what will the British attitude be? If we look back at the history of India, we can see that in last 150 years the Muslims failed. Why? Did they lack capacities? What guarantees do we have for the future? The lesson of history takes us to a different conclusion.
   There have been nations which suffered under the tyranny of a foreign power: they could not get freedom from oppression only when the oppressor became weak or the oppressed nation found an ally to create a new equilibrium between herself and the oppressor.
   See the example of Italy who found her independence by creating an equilibrium in her alliance with France against her oppressor, Austria, in 1860. Some of the Balkan states became free after the Berlin Congress of 1878, where many powers intervened in their favour. The war for the Greek independence was fought with the help of Britain and Italy: the battle of Navarrino in 1827, where the Ottoman fleet was destroyed.
   The rise of new powers always creates new equilibriums of forces: the oppressed nation finds her liberty or at least a better position.
   The rise of Japan in the East and of Italy and Germany in Europe, particularly Italy which is nearer to India than any other powers, is a guarantee of a new equilibrium.
   Lets us now face the question of Italy and India. The opening of the Suez Canal coincided with the formation of the Italian unity. This is a fact of great importance in considering the relations between European and India. The Suez Canal presents a double aspect: one regards the action of the Indian people to Europe, the other the action of Europe to India – a phenomenon of mutual action and reaction.
   It has been proved for example, that the Crimean war was won by Britain with French and Italian help, but when the danger reached Constantinople in 1877, Lord Beaconsfield called Indian troops to Cyprus. This shows that, in her European affairs, Britain depends more on her colonies than on Europe.
   However the opening of the Suez Canal helped the penetration of new ideas into India and the Far East and created contacts between the peoples of the East and France, Italy, and Germany (Valzeben, L’Angleterre et l’Inde, Paris, 1875, tome II).
   We have seen how Tipu Sultan asked for help from France for the freedom of India. Today, France has ceased to play her old role of freedom, equality, brotherhood: that century is definitely over and is only a chapter of history. Italy has taken her place in the Mediterranean and in the eastern affairs: she is in a better position than France because she is in the middle of the Mediterranean and nearer to the East. Besides, for her long and rich history Italy is more able to understand the oriental mentality, particularly Muslim, of the Mediterranean and outside it. After all, the movement towards East started from Italy with the sea republics of Venice, Genoa, Amalfi, who had contacts with the Islamic world: those populations still keep their old traditions and their capacity of mutual understanding of the Eastern peoples.
   What should the contacts of Italy in India be? in the advantage of both parts in view of a political balance in the world. Looking at the history of India we see that the only active community is the Muslim one, who is trying to create in the north-west part of India a Muslim state within the Indian Federation.
   The British government favours this project and encourages the creation of Pakistan. However, a quick glance to the history of India shows that Britain is in favour of Pakistan apparently; she wants to get the support of the Muslims in order to defend her empire which is destined to disappear. And the Muslim leaders are well aware that there is no consistence behind her crocodile tears.
   Italy should not take this British attitude seriously and should not condemn the idea of Pakistan according to the principle that the sympathetic attitude of the enemy is dangerous and Italy must oppose it in order to be in the opposite side.
   Britain knows very well that the creation of a Muslim state, though small, means the expulsion of the English from India within fifty years. This is proved by the political struggles of the last 150 years; the Muslims cannot deny their past history.
   All the peoples against the formation of a Muslim state favour the British game; it is only a circumstance that Britain shows her sympathy for the movement of Pakistan. 
   Therefore, Italy should move forward and declare to the world that the future equilibrium of India, or much better of the near East, depends on the establishment of an independent Muslim state in India, free from the clutches of the British manufacturers and bankers. The Muslims are not people who forget the help received in difficult times. Tomorrow, when they are free, and they will be free, they will consider Italy a true friend of theirs.