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==Chapter 7==
 
  
THE YEARS OF THE WAR: 1940-1945
 
 
 
The Italian political atmosphere had changed completely during the war. In the Thirties the fascist regime was not prepared to support the Muslim Indians openly and in a practical way. As already said in the Introduction, Italy was apparently trying to establish better relations with Britain: in more than one occasion, Dino Grandi himself had supported a policy of neutrality in the affairs between the Indians and the British and had invited his government to avoid contacts with Indian nationalists so as not to make Britain suspicious. Now, in a period of war, the Italian attitudes were different and Shedai’s return to Italy in 1940 was of course welcomed.
 
    Iqbal Shedai reached Rome on 20th November 1940 and lived there till the end of the war; after Mussolini’s fall, he moved to the north, to the territory of the Italian Social Republic (RSI).
 
    In Rome Shedai worked with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asia section, directed by Renato Prunas and his assistant Rodolfo Alessandrini. Shedai’s first task was to organize from Rome a radio service (Himalaya) in Hindustani language addressed to Muslim Indians. The contents of the broadcastings, which started in February 1941, regarded strikes, terrorist actions and sabotage in India and anything could damage British interests there: in his task Shedai was helped with information by the then Italian minister in Kabul, Pietro Quaroni. Actually a radio Bari had started broadcasting on 24th May 1934; in January 1938 a monthly magazine “Radyo Bari – Radio Araba di Bari” began its publication in Italian and Arabic.1
 
    The un-official broadcast from radio Himalaya was addressed mainly to Muslim Indians, who were strongly anti-British, in particular those along the borders with Afghanistan; besides it was necessary to counter-balance the British propaganda which insisted on the fact that the Japanese protected the Hindus and in case of conquest they would create an imperialistic Hindu Government under Chandra Bose. And when it was thought to have Bose speaking from radio Himalaya, Quaroni from Kabul on 20th February 1942 did not agree because he wanted radio Himalaya to maintain its Muslim character even though the broadcasting was addressed to all Indians, irrespective of religions.
 
    The clandestine radio Himalaya and the official radios Rome and Bari were actually complementary. One of the highest moments of large diffusion was on the occasion of the appeal of the Grand Mufti Amin al-Husain on 22nd August 1942. The spiritual guide of the Muslim world invited all the Indians to throw the English from their Country. Shedai thanked him underlying the fact that the radio was the voice of all the Indians, though he appealed in particular to his co-religionists; underneath there was his wish to emphasize the role of the Muslim League, which – as we have already seen in the previous chapters – needed to be recognized as the sole representative of the Muslim Indians in order to carry on with the project of Pakistan. However, Shedai’s successes increased the rivalry between him and Bose, who wanted himself to make use of radio Himalaya.
 
    The program of Shedai in October 1939 was very practical and clear:
 
Broadcasting in Hindustani and in Persian from Rome should be started soon. It is necessary to underline the fact that Russia is going to attack India and that the Indian army should remain in India; in this way Egypt, the Sudan and Kenya will be defenceless. [...] As things are, Italy must move soon to counterbalance the Anglo-French-Turkish propaganda, which is addressed not only against Germany, but above all Italy, who is the power with her main interests in the Mediterranean.
 
    Unfortunately, this program became effective fifteen months later, when a lot of time had been wasted because of the uncertainty of the Italian authorities.
 
    Only in the first months of 1941 did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepare a draft for India based on Shedai’s information:
 
    England is making India the largest base of operations against the Axis in the Mediterranean, in Africa and in the East. India is becoming the principal supplier of war materials for these three sectors; the British Secretary for India, Mr. Amery, has declared that India should supply from ten to twenty million soldiers to face the military power of the Axis. This will be carried on by compulsory recruit through India’s provincial governments.
 
    Therefore, it is necessary and urgent to carry out a plan of political and military action which makes India of no use for British intentions and, eventually, causes the fall of British rule. All this will mean the full victory of the Axis and the end of the war. It is advisable to go on with this work in Italy because she will get most advantages. [...].
 
    In the political field:
 
    1) Propaganda. It can be carried on through the radio. However, other subjects must be faced; workers’ strikes, terrorist and guerrilla actions in India in order to disturb the war industry, the British government activities, the supply to the army. Besides, to give radio instructions for strikes and terrorist attacks, the sabotage actions against railways, war material depots and English officers, etc.
 
    2) Creation of an Indian Nationalistic-Revolutionary Committee in Italy.
 
    3) And later on, an Indian Nationalistic-Revolutionary Government. For the time being, this is not advisable because the possibility of proclaiming the independence of India is not yet near and such a government might be considered a puppet government in the hands of the Axis.
 
    In the political-revolutionary field:
 
    1)The anti-British guerrilla of the tribes along the Indo-Afghan border is to be intensified and enlarged to all tribes besides the Waziris (the frontier tribes are about 250,000 armed men, who, as in 1919, are able to engage more than 100,000 Anglo-Indian soldiers [...].
 
    2) Technical means, such as radios, explosives, machine-guns, anti-aircraft weapons, etc. should be sent.
 
    3) Indian prisoners are to be used. All the Indians captured in North Africa and elsewhere should be sent to Italy [...] When the number of these prisoners-of-war is sufficient, an army and air force will be formed so as to be employed on the fronts where the English employ Indian troops.
 
    4) Weapons to be sent to India. This is the most important problem from the revolutionary point of view. The doctrine of non-violence has been accepted in India mainly because the population does not have weapons to use. If enough weapons are sent to India, as the Irish of America did for Ireland, it would be possible to develop a revolutionary movement and a guerrilla so as to make England loose the control of India. [...] These weapons can be sent as soon as we acquire some localities along the coasts of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean (secret expeditions to the Indian coasts by submarines or corsair ships) or we occupy countries from where to send these weapons by air.
 
    These were the main points of the draft. However the whole program depended on one problem: the weapons and how to send them to India. In the draft it was said that all the expenses, except the radio propaganda, were to be faced by the military authorities: this was enough to make the program nil, as the Italian army did not have sufficient equipment for itself, not to speak of the quantity needed for a sub-continent. Besides, there was the problem of occupying some military enclaves in territories under British control. In conclusion, something unrealistic!
 
    In April 1942 a “Society of Friends of India” was created by the IsMEO, then presided by Giovanni Gentile. The president of the society was Ezio Maria Gray, vice-president of the Chamber of “Fasci e Corporazioni”: Shedai was appointed its Secretary General. The opening ceremony took place in Rome on 28th April: all the most important Indian personalities were invited or were asked to give their consent, among them Subhas Chandra Bose and his personal secretary Nambiar, who were in Germany, Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah, Abu al-Kalam Azad, ‘Abd al-Ghaffar Khan, the Faqir of Ipi. In his speech E. M. Gray emphasized the affinity existing between Italy, a country who had been oppressed in the past, and India, a country oppressed by Britain, the common enemy to be defeated; and went on repeating some passages delivered by Mussolini on 22nd December 1933, stating in particular that Italy did not have any political or territorial interest for India save “promoting, establishing and defending in the world the kingdom of a better justice”.2
 
    Then spoke Shedai who paid his respects to Arnaldo Mussolini who had encouraged him, in a meeting in 1926, to foster friendship between Italy and India, and to Benito Mussolini who has always encouraged this friendship:
 
We Indians look at him [Mussolini] for encouragement and assistance in our effort to get our Country free from the satanic clutches of John Bull. [...]. In June 1926 I had the honour to meet the late Signor Arnaldo Mussolini in the premises of the “Popolo d’Italia” in Milan. After a long conversation his frankness – it was his own affirmation – made him my best friend in Italy. Very few people know the story of my meetings with that noble soul. Many Italians can confirm my words. The idea of making Italy and India in direct contact from a cultural and economical point of view was inspired to me by Arnaldo Mussolini. He promised to help me in the best possible way, but for many reasons that idea could not be realized at that time. After his untimely death, difficulties persisted: today, thanks to my perseverance and the goodwill of the Italian friends, they have been overcome, and if Arnaldo Mussolini were among us, he would have been happy to see that the seed sown by him about sixteen years ago has sprouted and is going to become a tree in blossom.3
 
    The programme of the Society was two-fold: monthly or bi-monthly lectures and practical help to all those categories of people interested in commercial and economic exchanges between Italy and India after the war. It is to be underlined the fact that this Society was created in a particular political period: is it only a coincidence that it was born after the fall of Singapore and the Japanese march to Burma? An issue of the IsMEO’s magazine “Asiatica” published in January-February 1942 an article “Il momento dell’India” (The moment of India) signed with the pseudonym “Politicus”, a kind of retrospective of India’s history in the light of the new military events.
 
    Some months before, in December 1941, Iqbal Shedai had attended a German-Italian-Indian meeting in Berlin concerning the problems of India and the Middle East: among the attendants were Subhas Chandra Bose, and Ghulam Siddiq Khan, former Foreign Minister of king Amanullah and his most active supporter in Berlin. The Italian delegation was headed by Rodolfo Alessandrini, in-charged of the “Asia office” in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who prepared a note about it for Ciano:
 
A special office has been established in Italy under the authority of the D.G.A.T. [Direction General for Transoceanic Affairs]: it is made up of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the SIM, of the Ministry of  Popular Culture, and of a group of Indian agents under Mr. Iqbal Shedai. This office has the task of concentrating all the problems concerning India and Middle East countries.
 
In Germany too an “India office” has been established, but made up of only Indian agents under Mr. Bose. It has been spoken of the possibility to convert, in the future, this Office into a mission of “Free India” in Germany. Mr. Bose insists on being recognized personally, but Germany has decided to postpone this recognition to the moment of the declaration of Indian independence [...].
 
    Our India office is exclusively Italian and Mr. Shedai is only a technical member. If in Berlin Mr. Bose is acknowledged as “Representative of India”, we shall attribute the same capacity to Mr. Shedai, who has been a faithful and loyal friend of ours for years and whose work has been very precious for us in recent times. It is to added that Mr. Shedai is a Muslim and that it is in our interest to have in Rome a Muslim as the first representative of the future India.4
 
    The subject discussed at Berlin meeting had already been dealt with by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who considered India being in its sphere of influence. In April 1941, ten months after the entry of Italy into the war, the Ministry prepared a draft. The opening paragraph read:
 
England is converting India into a large base of operations against the Axis in the Mediterranean, in Africa and in the East. India is becoming the principal supplier of war material. The Secretary of State for India, Leopold S. Amery, has declared that India is to supply from ten to twenty million soldiers. The British government intends to obtain it through a compulsory recruitment by the Indian provincial governments.5
 
    In view of this, the Italian Ministry reacted with “a political and military plan of action in order to make India not to be used by Britain”. How to put it into practice? From a political point of view it was necessary to use all the possible means of propaganda, to help Indian revolutionary parties who oppose Britain; from a military point of view it was necessary to send arms to the north-west frontier tribes and people expert in sabotage actions.
 
    However, the whole plan looked utopian. First of all, the majority party, the Indian National Congress, dominated by the personality of Gandhi, was in favour of a non-violent policy; the same was the attitude of the most important frontier party, the “Red Shirts” of ‘Abd al-Ghaffar Khan”, who though himself a Muslim was allied to the Congress. Secondly, for the supply of arms Italy needed to occupy “some ports along the coasts of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean”; but in 1941 the Italian forces were still fighting in North Africa and had not yet conquered Egypt as they intended to do. Finally, it was said that “the expenses for all the intelligence activities were to be borne by the Defence ministry”, who was not in a position to carry on with such kind of work.
 
    In 1939 Bose, who opposed the non-violent policy of the Indian National Congress, organized its left wing into a kind of party, the “Forward Bloc”. In two editorials of August 1939 Bose expressed his ideas about the new situation:
 
The Forward Bloc has appeared because the Congress must enter on a new phase in its evolutionary process. [...] Today the slogan of “unity at any price and under all circumstances” is a convenient slogan in the mouths of those who have lost dynamism and revolutionary urge. Let us not be led astray by its fascinating appeal. [...] It often happens that through compromise and co-operation with the right-wing, the left-wing gathers strength and extends its influence. In a different set of circumstances, this may not prove possible. It may be then necessary for the left-wing to differentiate itself from the right and consolidate and expand its strength and following. In such circumstances, a sharp conflict, though painful for the time being, may in reality be conducive to progress and be, in fact, unavoidable. [...] The Gandhiites of 1920 were the left wing in the Congress, but it does not follow there from that they are the left wing today. The leftists of yesterday often, if not always, become the rightists of to-morrow. [...] Between 1936 and 1938 the left wing of the Congress has grown and developed as a result of co-operation with the right. In September 1938 the cry was first raised on behalf of the right that co-operation with the left was no longer possible and that the left was becoming too noisy and troublesome to collaborate with. This new cry ultimately reached climax in 1939, when the right-wing deliberately decided to end co-operation with the left.6
 
    Having explained why the “Forward Bloc” had come into existence, Bose went on discussing the role of the new party which can be summarized in non-cooperation with Britain and in preparing the country for the coming struggle.
 
    The outcome was a strong hand by the British Government in India. Thousands members of the “Forward Bloc” were sent to prison or internment camps: Bose was arrested in July 1940. On 29th November he started a hunger-strike and on 5th December he was released and sent to house arrest in Calcutta, from where he escaped on 17th January 1941 and reached in an adventurous voyage Kabul, via Peshawar. There he contacted the Russian, German, and Italian Legations, but he was practically helped only by the Italians. The then head of the Italian Legation, Minister Pietro Quaroni, arranged for his long travel to Europe via Moscow and supplied him with a false passport under the name of Orlando Mazzotta, an employee of the Legation; with the connivance of the German Legation, Bose left for Moscow on 18th March, reaching Berlin on 2nd April.
 
    On 27th March 1941 the Minister Quaroni informed his Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bose’s programme; here are the main points:
 
Free constituted India along the line of free governments in London. Making of a treaty between the Free India Government and Italy, Germany and Japan, who would agree on the recognition of the full independence for India. Help from our part, i.e. a loan to encourage revolution in India. Bose gives great importance to radio broadcasting. Necessary preliminary for revolution in India is to persuade Indian people that England is going to lose the war. He will ask for permission to make special broadcasts of Free India.
 
    Among Quaroni’s information to his Ministry was an activity of propaganda and sabotage he had decided to support in the area of the North-West Frontier of India, among those tribes, with the help of Bose’s secretary. The Italian Minister was a good connoisseur of the Afghan situation: a remark of him is astonishing. He said clearly:
 
However it is my impression that if last June [1940] we had been organized to operate in India, it might have then been possible to make events coming to a head. Since a similar situation may occur this year, it is advisable to arrange right now for means of action in order to take advantage of the first available occasion.7
 
    This story of Italy’s support of an anti-British guerrilla in the borderland area goes back to the late Thirties. On 16th April 1937, the “Daily Herald” claimed on its front page that “Mussolini was behind the revolt of the North-West Frontier Province”. Probably it was only a rumour, but, as a matter of fact, Quaroni was already at Kabul and may have started being involved in those affairs. Two years after, on 26th February 1939, the “Sunday Chronicle” implied that a radio-link between the Faqir of Ipi8 and the Italians had been established. We do not know whether that information was true; however, in the draft on India of April 1941, it was stated:
 
It is necessary also to send technical equipments, such as radio sets to link the operative direction with the various tribes and the Faqir of Ipi with this place [Italy], along with code-books, binoculars, materials to make explosives and bombs, machine-guns, anti-aircraft weapons, etc; materials to be sent partly now and partly after we have occupied a territory (Syria and Iraq) situated at such a distance from the Indo-Afghan frontier as to deliver them by planes. In the meantime it is advisable to send the Faqir of Ipi some military technicians to look after the making, the use and the servicing of the arms and the equipments, besides instructing the natives.9
 
    In his recollections,10 Pietro Quaroni devoted many pages to this problem. From the 1930s the Faqir of Ipi, a village located in North Waziristan, had started a guerrilla against the British. His force, about 3,000/4,000 tribesmen, were armed with rifles, a few machine guns and some antiquated cannons. The Faqir needed modern arms and money; the Italian minister along with his First Secretary Enrico Anzilotti decided to contact the Faqir in order to exploit him for Italy’s purpose: it was a reciprocal exchange. The Faqir accepted the offer of arms and money for his fight against the British; as for Quaroni he could benefit of the unrest created among the tribes by keeping British troops engaged along the border instead of being sent to Africa against the Italian army. In June 1941 Anzilotti, disguised as a Pathan tribesman, went to Gorwekht, the Faqir’s headquarter, to discuss the modes of their co-operation; eventually money and arms were sent from the German legation in Kabul because the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was too slow to help the Faqir. In his book The Indian Struggle 1920-1942, Bose reported what was Quaroni’s thought in February 1941:
 
If in June 1940, that is at the time when the defeat of England seemed certain, we had a ready organization like the one Bose proposes now, it could have been attempted to liberate India, and it might have been possible. Politically and militarily India is the cornerstone of the British Empire. Last year’s chance is gone, but a similar one could come this year also; one should be ready to take full advantage of it [...]. Our enemies, in all their wars, the present one included, have always largely used the “revolution” weapon with success: why should we not learn from our enemies? Two things are necessary to make revolutions: men and money. We do not have the men to start a revolution in India, but luck as put them in our hands; no matter how difficult Germany’s and our monetary situation is, the money that this movement requires is certainly not lacking. It is only a question of valuing the pros and cons and to decide on the risk.11
 
    However, as reported in 1943, Quaroni himself had already realized during the summer of 1941 that the Axis plans to use the Faqir of Ipi were a waste of time and money. He gave four reasons why it became impossible to start a general revolt on the Frontier by using the Faqir after the outbreak of the Russo-German war:
 
a) the Faqir’s authority was too circumscribed.
 
b) even with unlimited supplies of arms the Faqir could not gather more than 10,000 adherents.
 
c) he and his men would be useless outside their mountain fastness.
 
d) the Faqir relied on arms which could no longer be supplied by land after Hitler had attacked Russia whence previously arms could have been smuggled as “factory machinery”.12
 
    As regards the idea of sending warplanes to the Faqir, Quaroni believed that it had been technically feasible since Italy possessed at the time long-distance planes which could have taken off from their base at Rhodes. However, this idea had been rejected by the Faqir on the ground that planes would attract the attention of the British, who might bomb his headquarters and all the surrounding villages.
 
    At the beginning of 1942, when general Rommel with his “Afrika Korps” was advancing towards Egypt, the British secretary of state for India, L. S. Amery promised India “full and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth”, but after the war. On 6th February, from Kabul Quaroni informed Ciano that it was the right time for the tripartite powers to take a stand in favour of the Indian problem. The minister underlined that the British propaganda was insisting on the fact that Japan was protecting the Hindus who, in their turn, will oppress the Muslims; he added that the Muslims of the frontier tribes were terribly worried. He concluded that it was necessary to take a stand in the matter. One month after, on 5th March, Quaroni asked Ciano to make some propaganda in favour of Bose, similar to the German propaganda from radio Berlin.
 
    Of great interest is the probable last long report of Quaroni to Mussolini, who had resumed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after Ciano’s destitution on 5th February: it is dated 9th June 1943, a few weeks before the Allied Forces’ attack to Sicily and Mussolini’s fall. Quaroni explained that it was against the Italian interests to make propaganda in favour of the unity of all parties in India, just like the Germans and the English were doing, though in different ways. The interest of Italy was to adopt a policy favourable to the Muslims and supporting their claims for an independent state of Pakistan: the Indian Muslims did not want to be liberated of the British to fall into the hands of the Hindus. In conclusion, the minister advised not to follow the German propaganda against Jinnah and to remain neutral in the matter.13
 
    Iqbal Shedai was considered by the top-level people of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs their most useful agent because of his long staying in Europe and because he was a Muslim, both qualities being important for all the problems concerning India and the Middle East. Both Bose and Shedai agreed on the necessity of a three-party declaration of India’s independence: but only Mussolini was in favour of it, Hitler and Ciano were against it. Alessandrini, however, insisted on his support to Shedai:
 
[...] we thought and still think that Bose’s support to the cause of India is [...] personal. Mr. Shedai has made interesting considerations I agree upon. This does not mean that Mr. Bose is not to be considered and that our co-operation with him is to be changed; but it is Mr. Shedai our reference, above all because he is a Muslim.
 
Though the Germans have given Mr. Bose all possible facilities, they share our point of view. He is an intelligent man who, with his “Forward Bloc”, has succeeded in abandoning Gandhi’s negative policy, which is harmful and producing the opposite effect. However, in a near future, Bose might be the man to apply for the new accomplishments of the Axis in India. Waiting for that moment, I am sure that people more courageous and more practical like Shedai are of immediate use today.14
 
    Alessandrini underlined the fact that Shedai was “a Muslim”. This fact explains the contrast between Shedai and Bose in Europe. It is true that the programme of the two men had a common goal: the independence of India; however, their rivalry was harmful for the Indian cause. Besides, they chose to work independently: Bose in Germany, Shedai in Italy. Throughout the war, Bose worked with the Germans and later on with the Japanese, Shedai with the Italians, and only in a few occasions their roads met.
 
    Summing up, the requests of Bose and Shedai were three: a) diplomatic recognition; b) broadcasting radio messages into India; c) the creation of an Indian army.
 
    Diplomatic recognition: this was the most controversial point. Neither Germany nor Italy were really interested in India’s future: Germany because India belonged to the political and commercial sphere of Italian interests; Italy because India was supposed to be in the future a part of her colonial programme, a sort of an extension of the Italian colonial empire after the defeat of Britain. However, a diplomatic recognition depended only on the military operations (in 1941 the German advance to the Caucasus, in 1943 the Japanese march towards India). Only in 1943 did Bose succeed in getting an official recognition from Japan and from the Italian Social Republic;15 in February Germany got rid of him by accepting his request to join the Japanese after the fall of the former British colonies of Burma, Malaya, and Singapore. Thus Bose was able to create in south-east Asia a large army made up of Indian prisoners-of-war, willing to join his ranks, in order to support the Japanese advance. On the occasion he received diplomatic recognition, but it was too late. This problem of the recognition was mentioned many times by Galeazzo Ciano in his diary:
 
June 6, 1941. I receive Bose, head of the Indian insurgent movement. He would like the Axis to make a declaration on the independence of India, but in Berlin his proposals have been received with a great deal of reserve. Nor must we be compromised, especially because the value of this youngster is not clear. Past experience has given rather modest results.
 
    April 14, 1942. The Japanese have proposed a tripartite declaration on the independence of India and Arabia. First reactions in Berlin are unfavourable. The Japanese initiative is not welcome in regions close to Europe. Mussolini on the other hand, wanted to adhere to the proposal immediately.
 
    May 4, 1942. I receive Bose, had of the Hindu Nationalists. He feels badly when he learns that the declaration in favour of independence for India has been postponed sine die. He believes that in this way we are playing the game of Japan, which will act on its own account without considering the interests of the Axis. He now thinks that British domination in India is coming to an end. British forces are small and the Indian forces have no desire to fight. Naturally, we must take these declarations of Bose for what they are, because he is trying to turn the water to his mill.
 
    May 5, 1942. I go with Bose to the Duce. A long conference without any new developments, except the fact that Mussolini allowed himself to be persuaded by the arguments adduced by Bose to obtain a tripartite declaration in favour of Indian independence. He has telegraphed the Germans proposing – contrary to the Salzburg decisions – proceeding at once with the declaration. I feel that Hitler will not agree to it very willingly.16
 
    In fact Hitler did not agree. In his Diary Joseph Goebbels wrote on 11th May:
 
We do not like this idea very much, since we do not think the time has yet come for such a political manoeuvre. It does appear though that the Japanese are very eager for some such step. However, émigré governments must not live too long in a vacuum. Unless they have some actuality to support them, they only exist in the realm of theory.
 
    The Germans were not even interested in emphasizing Bose’s role; two months before, on 1st March, Goebbels had written:
 
We have succeeded in prevailing upon the Indian Nationalist leader, Bose, to issue an imposing declaration of war against England. It will be published most prominently in the German press and commented upon. In that way we shall now begin our official fight on behalf of India, even though we do not as yet admit it openly.
 
    Radio broadcasting: this was possible, both for Bose from Berlin and for Shedai from Rome. Though this kind of propaganda was quite useful, its success was limited: the illiterate masses were excluded from these facilities; besides, in many regions there was a serious shortage of food, particularly in Bengal, Malabar, Bijapur, Orissa, where about two million people died of hunger in 1943-44, and under these conditions people were interested only in their survival.
 
    Indian army: in the beginning, the parallel efforts of Bose and Shedai were not fruitful. Both of them created an Indian legion with Indian soldiers captured in Africa by the Germans and by the Italians: these legions were of no practical use. The German legion consisted of only 3,000 people, who were sent to France, in the Bordeaux area, in the last months of the war; from there they retreated to the camp of Oberhofen,  near Colmar, in Alsace, and later after to Italy, along the Gothic line, where they captured by the French Allied forces in April. The Italian legion, about 2,000 people, created in April 1942, mutinied and was disbanded in November.
 
    On the contrary, a great importance had the Indian National Army (INA) created by Bose in south-east Asia. This force of about 30,000 people was fully armed by the Japanese and placed under the absolute control of Bose, who could also dispose of a larger part of the Indian population living there. In the summer of 1944 the Japanese were finally ready to begin their invasion of India: they attacked from Burma hoping to capture Imphal, on the Indian border, from where to prolong their march to Delhi. The INA issued and used (so it is stated) their own stamps with the inscriptions “Arz-i hukumat-i Azad Hind” and “Chalo Delhi”, meaning that the march would end at Delhi (earlier, in March 1942, the Andaman and Nicobar islands, in the Bay of Bengal, had been occupied by the Japanese). Unfortunately, the attack to Imphal failed; furthermore, the war in the Pacific was going very badly for the Japanese, who had to move their air power from Burma to the Pacific theatre. The morale of the INA troops broke down; Bose was practically abandoned by his ally and the Ina was left to its destiny.
 
    For sake of information, we must mention the activity in Japan of a forerunner of Bose, Raja Mahendra Pratap,17 a strange personality, a sort of prophet and visionary, who during the Second World War lived in Tokyo and started or wanted to organize the Indians living in the south-east of Asia. He was very soon replaced by Chandra Bose: he remained famous for a message he addressed to Mussolini in 1942, a message full of praise but rhetoric and too vague.
 
    Let us go back to Berlin meeting. Besides the conversations of German and Italian representatives in Berlin with Bose and Shedai, a special meeting was called to examine the situation in Afghanistan, which was strictly connected with the Indian problems. It was attended by Ghulam Siddiq Khan, former Minister of foreign affairs of king Amanullah,18 who reported that Afghanistan was ready to rebel against Britain and to start a guerrilla at the frontiers with India. The author of the report, Alessandrini, was doubtful about this; however, he was hopeful only in case the army of the Axis could reach the Caucasus in the next Spring [1942]. He wrote that the armed intervention of Japan and the Japanese march towards the Indian sub-continent would be decisive for the Axis’ attitude regarding Amanullah, who “at the right time can be recognized as the new king of Afghanistan and the new head of that Muslim state of the Middle East which the Afghans have been longing for long and which we want strictly connected to our Muslim colonial system”.19
 
    The anti-British propaganda from the clandestine radio of Rome, named “Himalaya” after the title of the first poem by Allama Iqbal in his first book in Urdu, Bang-i Dara [The Call of the Caravan], was the most active and the most followed in India so as to make the British government of India worried: however they were not able to locate it. They thought it was located in the area of Waziristan, at the borders of India, because its broadcastings were clearly heard. In a book of memoirs Pietro Quaroni, then minister in Kabul, wrote that he was sceptical when he was told of a radio broadcasting in Hindustani from the Himalaya: after an inquiry, he was informed by Filippo Anfuso, then Ciano’s first private secretary, that the radio broadcast from Rome:
 
The broadcasting was technically perfect: I have never understood how was it possible to have a clear programme from Radio Rome, which generally arrived faint and with breaks. The speaker was of first rate: he was able to mix politics and propaganda along with lewd jokes appreciated by Indians and Afghans. He was varied, pleasant, and practical: his programs had become one of the daily events in Kabul’s life, which did not offer much diversion and people gathered to listen to them.20
 
    For Quaroni, Italian ambassador in France from February 1947, the mystery about the speaker remained such until 1948 when, the war over, he received a phone call during a meeting of the United Nations in Paris: it came from a member of the delegation of Pakistan, who said to him in a broken Italian:
 
“I am so and so”.
 
“...?”
 
“Don’t you recognize me?”.
 
“Truly, I don’t”.
 
“Right, you can’t know: I am Radio Himalaya”.
 
    Only today, after many years, are we able to identify that gentleman whose name the Ambassador, a perfect diplomat, did not want to reveal in his memoirs.21
 
    In spite of the fact that Shedai’s radio propaganda had been highly appreciated by the fascist government, the rivalries between Italians and Germans posed many problems to Shedai. The relations between Shedai and Bose had never been good, but the two had to collaborate while in Europe. In October 1942, because of pressures from Germany under Bose’s input, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to stop the propaganda from radio Himalaya: probably Bose was angry for the refusal to him to speak from that radio, probably the Germans were worried of the Italian success, or most probably there have been contrasts between the Italians and the Germans in the recruitment of Indian prisoners-of-war in Africa. It seems, in fact, that Bose had not been given by the Italian Government permission to go to Libya while Shedai was there.
 
    Shedai accepted the imposition but asked either for another job or for leave: the Germans and the Japanese were eager to use him for their propaganda. Fortunately, early 1943 Bose left for south-east Asia, and Shedai could resume his broadcast. However, in order not to emphasize the Muslim character of radio Himalaya, as in the past, Shedai underlined its non-confessional attitude, irrespective of any religion:
 
Radio Himalaya has resumed its broadcast to India after a silence of three and a half months. You know that radio Himalaya, for 98 per cent, addresses to the Indian peasants and workers and that our religion is the full independence of India. Our faith is serving India and our position in front of the communities is: neither Jew, nor Christian, nor Zoroastrian, nor Muslim.22
 
    Actually Shedai’s propaganda was helpful more to Muslim Indians than to the cause of the independence of India. It filled the void left by the Congress during the three-year period of internment of its leaders23 and gave the Muslim League the possibility of becoming the true representative of the Indian Muslims. Between 1942 and 1945 the members of the Muslim League reached two millions and the dream of an independent Pakistan was near to come true.
 
    More efficacious was Bose’s propaganda in the absence of the active presence of Gandhi and Nehru who had been interned. He was helped by the Italian press who spread the conviction that the struggle between Gandhi’s India and Britain was at its most crucial moment. In fact, on 9th August 1942, with a radio-message Bose insisted on the fact that the international situation was favourable to the success of the Indian independence since the military and political situation for the British in Africa was bad and after the liberation of Egypt there would inevitably follow the freedom of India. Hence his countrymen should take advantage of this particular moment and support the effort of the Axis. Then he insisted on the fact that India had been involved in the conflict without the consent of her people and that the non-violent civil disobedience was unable to fulfil its goal which was possible to get only through arms. A week after, on 15th August, Bose spoke again on the radio: he emphasized the riots after the internment of the Congress’ leaders, the failure of the Atlantic Charter which did not apply to India, the sympathy towards India’s struggle in the world press, the support to her cause by the Indians living abroad, concluding with the appeal to create the most possible damage to the British in India and to invite all the parties, such as the Mahasabha, the Muslim League and the Akali, to join for a common effort.
 
    After Mussolini’s fall on 25th July 1943 and the events after 8th September, Shedai left for the north: in Rome there was nothing more to do for him, who ran the risk of being taken by the British. However, in the north the situation was very critical: Shedai recreated in Milano the “Society of Friends of India” and resumed his work of propaganda.
 
    On 26th March 1944 the “Corrispondenza Repubblicana” published an unsigned article L’India agli Indiani [India to the Indians]; it was written by Mussolini himself on the occasion of the advance of the Japanese and Indian troops from Burma to the eastern frontiers of India. He wrote:
 
The event which can have a great effect on the course of the war and can produce unforeseeable developments in the world history has taken place. The indefaticable and heroic armies of Japan, along with the Indian troops of Chandra Bose have crossed the Indian border [...]. This event had been waited for since Chandra Bose, after leaving Europe, had reached Burma in a mysterious voyage and had assembled there the first troops of the Indian National Army [...] The door of India could not be opened from the inside through a popular revolt as the Anglo-American troops would have easily crushed them or from the outside by Chandra Bose’s weak Indian National Army: the help of Japan was needed [...]. The wheel of destiny is running. In this war full of unforeseen and unforeseeable events, after the Pacific phase, the Indian phase has started. No need to say that the Italians of the Social Republic, and probably the Ialians beyond the Garigliano, follow with deep sympathy the march of the liberating Indian troops, which are, de jure et de facto, along with the Axis armies.24
 
    Actually the article did not speak much of India’s freedom, but dealt with the religious and linguistic situation in the sub-continent; only in the end did Mussolini hope in a victory of the Japanese without adding anything might influence the Italian situation.
 
    On the occasion, Shedai sent to Mussolini a letter of congratulations and thanks, signing it “Your Indian revolutionary pupil”. It was apparently the last contact: Shedai remained to the side of the Italian Social Republic until April 1945.
 
    After the independence of the sub-continent Shedai returned to Pakistan.25 In spite of the opposition from Ghulam Muhammad, then Minister of Finance, and Iskandar Mirza linked to the intelligence services, who were after him because of his progressive ideas, Shedai was included in the Kashmir Delegation led by the Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan. After cease-fire was declared in December 1948, Shedai went home living in Karachi where he continued his free-lance work concerning the World Muslim Association of Pakistan in Lahore. In the  Fifties he decided to go back to Italy where he is reported to have taught Urdu language at the Is.M.E.O., University of Turin, from 1957 to 1964, and to have worked after the project of building a mosque and creating an Islamic Cultural Centre in Rome with the help of the Agha Khan (the would-be president), the Egyptian Government, and the Holy See.26
 
    In 1964 Shedai returned to Pakistan, living the last ten years of his life in the house of a maternal nephew, ‘Abd ul-Rahman Bhutta. He died on 13th January 1974.
 
NOTES AND REFERENCES
 

Latest revision as of 22:04, 11 July 2018